I recently reviewed the literature on musical hallucinations, firmly concluding that these arise from inner ear irritation, irrespective of otological, neurological, psychiatric, psychological, medical, or pharmacological comorbidity (2) . Musical hallucinations seem to be the source of artistic creativity in composers (3), poets, and some writers and performers who use musical or rhythmic structures. Deconstructing creativity and illness and proposing a limited theoretical linkage simplifies the problem.
Weissman's detailed textual analysis showed clearly that classical poetry was dictated by voices or auditory hallucinations, confrrming the otogenic theory (4) . Another study confrrmed that poetry writing did not vary with a writer's mental state: poets with psychosis were highly similar to controls on the 11 dimensions rated (5) . Use ofpoetic devices was similar, whether phonological (rhyme and alliteration), syntactic (modified repetition), or semantic (metaphor).
Consider the account of Stewart, a highly intelligent, literate poet and self-described psychotic (6) . Short outbursts of poetic activity alternated with long, barren intervals. "Each of these creative periods, if they can so be described, coincided with my deepest and most prolonged periods of depression and despair." "When I was writing the 'automatic' poems, I might just as well have been a gramophone or a tape-recorder." He assumed he was a seer and was "controlled and informed by a divine voice," exactly the process described by Weissman in poets in general (4) . In the introduction, Burt notes the resemblance between the emotional experiences expressed in Stewart's poems and those in Wordsworth's and Blake's baffling lyrics (6) , the hallucinatory origin of which Weissman detailed.
Stewart also implicates musical hallucinations. In his poems he writes, "Ten thousand twangling wires make melody"; "A disembodied blare from hidden music boxes torments."
He also had otic symptoms comprising the Hear syndrome (2) . Audiosensitivity: "Loud noises pierced my ears and into my brain with the pain of a stabbing knife, so that I felt like 91 shrieking. I believe this condition is known to the psychologists as Hyperaesthesia." Tinnitus: Scratchings, cries, and sounds of waves and winds. "I found certain images and rhythms crystallizing in my mind." Vertigo: "I am now seized by a feeling of weakness, swimming in the head." Aural fullness: Tightness, tension in the head; "a strong pressure inside both ears and particularly in the left ear." Insomnia from tinnitus: In "Insomnia" he wrote "Beat in my brain the unrelenting whispers."
Waddell undervalued Ludwig's extensive biographical analysis (7) of a representative sample of 1005 high achievers from 18 professional groups. This study refuted Ludwig's own hypothesis of equivalent psychopathology in these groups. As predicted by the otogenic theory, creative artists like poets, fiction writers, actors, and composers had more hallucinogenic disorders due to drug use or mental illness.
AG Gordon London, UK

Association of Diogenes Syndrome With a Compulsive Disorder
Dear Sir:
Diogenes syndrome was initially described by Clark and others in elderly patients to describe a state of gross personal neglect associated with rubbish hoarding and social isolation in individuals of higher than average intelligence (1) . The condition is associated with a defmite psychiatric diagnosis, most often psychosis and dementia, in about 50% of patients (2) . This is the first description, to our knowledge, of its association with a compulsive disorder.
Mrs B, aged 48 years, mother of 3 children, was compulsorily referred to the psychiatric ward for fear that she might harm herselfafter her youngest son (12 years) had been placed in a foster home by court order. The placement had been motivated by numerous reports by social workers and schoolteachers ofgrossly inadequate educational conditions, mainly lack ofeducational material. Indeed, the apartment was found to be barely furnished (2 beds, no chairs, no table), cluttered with bags of litter and unopened mail. The child appeared to be reasonably well tended and in fairly good physical condition, although he needed glasses. The patient herself was in a state of gross physical neglect, with untreated venous ulcers and poor general and oral hygiene. She used to spend her days wandering through the streets of the city. Her neighbours clearly were aware ofthe oddity ofher behaviour, but she had managed to establish a fairly large social network outside the immediate vicinity of her apartment.
At admission, blood glucose, calcium, protein, and iron levels were slightly below normal minima. The initial psychiatric assessment provided no evidence for active affective disorder, psychosis, or dementia; however, thorough psychiatric investigation was hampered by the patient's suspicious and defiant attitude. Mrs B, a former French teacher, appeared to possess good rhetorical skills and higher than average intelligence (although no formal IQ testing was performed). She strongly opposed her hospitalization and alleged that her lifestyle was the expression of her personal freedom and, at most, the result of low income and untoward events. This initial opposition, however, tended to remit after the first few days, and she was more willing to speak about other problems and accept psychiatric interviews and psychological testing. She presented compulsive symptoms (hand-washing), which had been hidden and denied and had therefore gone unnoticed during the first days of the hospital stay. Upon further investigation, Mrs B admitted to having presented with a major depressive disorder after the deaths of 3 relatives in rapid succession some twenty years ago; subsequently, while sharing a house with her mother, she developed a strong distaste for touching objects that her mother had touched and, when she could not avoid doing so, felt the urge to wash her hands to relieve her tension. In subsequent years, a similar behaviour appeared regarding her husband, from whom she was separated at the time ofher hospital admission. Although she was well aware that this was an abnormal and irrational behaviour, she never sought professional help.
Although Diogenes syndrome has been described in mostly elderly persons, its occurrence in middle age has been previously mentioned (3); in the present case, a school-aged child was living with the patient, which raises specific problems. The child seemed to accept and comply with, rather than to take part in, his mother's odd behaviour; to this extent, the notion of Diogenes syndrome by proxy, which has been previously described (4), does not apply here. Concerns for the child's safety and educational needs prompted a more rapid and assertive intervention than would have otherwise been required for his mother alone.
Overall, Diogenes syndrome still raises many unresolved issues. It is associated with an increasing number of psychi-atric conditions; however, investigation of the psychopathological or nosological links with the concomitant disorder(s) is still lacking. To this extent, we suggest that cases associated with dementia or psychosis be distinguished from other (or unspecified) psychiatric diagnoses for a higher heuristic value. Management is often difficult (5) . Nonconformity to social standards does not warrant compulsory care; however, the increasing recognition ofthe syndrome in adults raises the question of the well-being of vulnerable, dependants such as elderly parents (4) 
Hypercortisolemia and Post-ECT Confusion
We learned from geriatric cases (I) and reviews (2) that hypercortisolemia is cognitively and affectively deleterious.
Putative mechanisms include interference with long-term potentiation (LTP) and direct hippocampal toxicity and cellloss (3, 4) . Elderly persons with frailty, depression, or dementia may be particularly vulnerable because ofdiminished homeostatic reserve and enhanced adrenal sensitivity leading to hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis hyperactivity (5) . Treatment resistance, common in depressed elderly, is also associated with hypercortisolemia (6) .
Would hypercortisolemia contribute to poor recovery from confusion after electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) indepressed elderly? To test this hypothesis we measured afternoon (2:30 PM) cortisol levels before and after 74 consecutive ECTs in a group of 20 geriatric patients. PM cortisol levels were used in the beliefthat diurnal rhythmicity and narrower laboratory reference range (90-300 nmol/l) allowed easier detection of day-night reversals or hyperactivity. Subjects were rated for confusion 5--6 hours after ECT: same or worse.
Results N = 74. Cortisol: normal before and after ECT (:::; 300 nrnol/l) = 45; elevated before and/or after ECT (> 300 nmolfl) = 29. Sensorium: same = 49; worse = 25. Fourteen subjects with hypercortisolemia (14/29 = 48%) had worse recovery (df = I, P = 0.034).
These findings suggest that hypercortisolemia, regardless of etiology, is associated with higher rates of post-ECT confusion and sluggish recovery to pre-ECT sensorium.
Hypercortisolemia has been causally implicated in cognitive impairment and treatment-resistant depression. Antiglucocorticoid treatments, which normalize the HPA axis, have been effective (6) . HPA-axis dysfunction may be a treatable cause of severe post-ECT memory impairment, confusion, and/or ECT treatment resistance. Given that relatively safe and inexpensive antiglucocorticoid strategies already exist (7) and more are being discovered (8) , it behoves us to research screening and pretreatment of high-risk hypercortisolemia patients. For safer and more effective ECT, correcting HPA axis dysfunction also may reduce sluggish response and treatment resistance in the pharmacotherapy of depression. Clearly, much more rigorous research is needed in this area. 
Level of Schooling and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
Since Kraeplin, several authors have pointed out that persons with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) tend to be highly intelligent. This "high" intelligence ofobsessives is a controversial subject. Obsessive patients were compared with schizophrenia patients by Lo (I), with other "neurotic" patients by Ingram (2) , and with depressive patients by Coryell (3). All found a higher level of intelligence among the obsessive patients. Conversely, Kringlen points to the apparently higher intelligence of the obsessive group compared with control groups, but he did not observe a statistically significant difference. Rasmussen and Tsuang analyzed a series of studies concerning the intelligence of obsessive patients and concluded that the idea of these patients having higher intelligence is mostly bas~d on clinical impressions, without the support ofpsychometnc tests (5) .
It was subsequently verified that this higher intelligence was related to high verbal IQ. This assertion hypothesizes a hyperfunctioning of the functions of the left hemisphere in relation to the those of the right, resulting in a better performance in verbal tests. However, this role of hemispherical laterality has been ruled out (6) .
A recent neurological study has demonstrated that victims of OCD demonstrate a delay in the evocation of nonverbal information in relation to the control group; these alterations were more consistent with deficits in memory retrieval than in memory storage (7) . The authors suggest that selective alteration in nonverbal memory may be linked to lateralization, the relationship between deficit and dysfunction being possible in the right corticostriatal system already described in these patients. They emphasize, however, that these interpretations should be considered speculatory.
In a study describing and comparing the clinical and demographic characteristics of 53 patients with OCD or OCD with comorbidity by Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R) criteria, treated in the Affective Disturbances Unit of the Hospital das Clinicas at Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Brazil, we observed a level of schooling much higher in the patients than in the control group (X 2 = 18.47; P < 0.0001). The control group comprised 53 out-patients of the same university hospital, with no psychiatric record, paired by sex and age (± 2 years). As clients of the same hospital, which serves patients from low-income groups, it is assumed that the populations were homogeneous from a sociocultural-economic viewpoint. With respect to level of schooling, no relationship was observed.
From these findings, we are unable to assert that the patients with OCD were more intelligent than the control-group patients. Additional studies, combining neuropsychological and functional neuroimaging tests, are clearly necessary to clarify this stilI controversial subject.
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Re: Sexual Recidivism in Sex Offenders
Greenberg's recent review on sexual recidivism (1) is a timely reminder that, despite the often inflammatory rhetoric that tends to emanate from media, child protection agencies, and courts ("Once a child molester, always a child molester;" "Child molesters are highly dangerous"), sexual offenders recidivate much less than those who commit other crimes (for example, nonsexual assaults, theft): 10% for incest perpetrators and 20% for extrafamilial child molesters.
Most molesters engage in nonpenetrative fondling ofvarious types without physical violence or other forms of coercion. Ofcourse, such behaviours are none other than criminal and egregiously unacceptable; however, "facts," not prejudice or caprice, should guide court, child-access, and treatment decisions.
Thus, in a series of 65 male child molesters referred to me by courts, lawyers, and children's aid societies for "risk assessment," only 8 penetrated (or attempted to), and in no case was there evidence of the victim being damaged physically. These cases are currently in their 4th to 11th year of follow-up. Only 6 subjects have been reconvicted for a sexual offence.
Greenberg advocates a combined actuarial and empirically guided clinical assessment approach as optimal for predicting risk ofreoffence. He mentions the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (Revised), the Michigan Alcohol Screening Test, and phallometry. I strongly endorse his views: the more data available, the better the prediction. However, in addition to the aforementioned, I recommend the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (RRAS), which was introduced in New Jersey, United States, in 1995. This scale was developed "to assess risk" in a uniform, consistent manner. It was determined that the Scale should assess 2 main components of potential reoffence risk: 1) the seriousness of the offence should the offender recidivate and 2) the likelihood that the offender would recidivate.
"Seriousness" and "likelihood" are important variables. For instance, in the case of a "compulsive exhibitionist," although there may be a high likelihood ofreoffence (higher than for other transgressor groups), there is minimal harm from a reoffence, so "seriousness" is low. The offence is considered to be a "nuisance" rather than a danger. Conversely, with a violent offender (for example, a sadistic rapist) who has a history ofsubstantial victim harm, even a relatively low likelihood of reoffence may result in moderate or high risk to the community, given the nature of the offence.
The RRAS consists of 4 items as follows: 1) The seriousness ofthe offence: degree of force, degree of contact, age of victim. 2) Offence history: victim selection, number of offences/victims, duration of offensive behaviour, length of time since last offence, history of antisocial acts. 3) Characteristics of the offender: response to treatment, substance abuse. 4) Community support: therapeutic support, residential support, employment, educational stability.
The factors are weighted, with those assessing seriousness of the offence being heaviest. Illustratively, an offender whose prior offenses have involved violence, an extremely young victim, and sexual penetration (physical damage) would be more likely to fall in a higher risk category. The RRAS has been described in detail elsewhere (2) .
Finally, a cautionary note on the use ofphallometry. There is a widely prevalent myth that this procedure is invaluable in diagnosis (especially ofpedophilia), risk prediction risk, and even determination of "guilt or innocence" in a person who denies a sexual offence.
Practically speaking, phallometry has extremely limited application. Phallometric findings (which are consistent over several testings and reflect maximal arousal to children) may correlate with a diagnosis of pedophilia already made on detailed clinical, psychometric, and historical data (an established and clear history of repeated sexual offences against children, admission ofsexual urges towards children or strong presumptive evidence of such, the confirmed use of child pornographic materials). It is widely agreed that the results of phallometric testing conducted in isolation have extremely poor diagnostic or predictive validity. In situations with legal implications (questions of guilt or innocence in an individual who denies any offence, without confirming evidence; release from prison; custody matters where there is no proof of any sexual wrongdoing), phallometric data in decision-making is totally inappropriate and could result in serious errors.
Two recent excellent reviews fairly conclude that the validity and clinical utility of plethysmography in the assessment and treatment of sexual deviance remain to be established (3, 4) .
outcome. The emergence of client-centred community treatments, such as assertive community treatment (ACT), for serious mental illness requires new ways of evaluating treatment effectiveness. Because ACT is targeted to client needs and allows clients to set the treatment goals, the client is the most reasonable source of information to measure treatment effectiveness. Yet in 20 years of ACT research, few studies have investigated treatment effectiveness from the clients' perspective, beyond basic satisfaction with care. Client reports have been avoided in psychiatric settings, partly because clients are perceived to be unreliable respondents (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) . However, there has been little research on the reliability of client reports to support or disprove this assumption, and new principles for outcome research in mental health stress the need for client involvement in outcome evaluations (1, 4, 5) . This suggests the need for research on the reliability of client reports.
The feasibility study we conducted provides preliminary results on the stability of client responses over time. The subjects were patients (n = 27) at the London Psychiatric Hospital. Questionnaires investigating symptoms (Brief Symptom Inventory); personality related to social function (Jackson Personality Inventory); and quality oflife (Wisconsin Quality of Life Index) were administered by interview twice, approximately 1 month apart.
One month is a relatively long period between interviews and increases the probability of true change, which would reduce test-retest reliability (6, 7) . Despite a severely ill, small sample, the test-retest reliability for each questionnaire was moderate (Brief Symptom Inventory ICC = 0.79; Jackson Personality Inventory ICC = 0.52-0.87; Wisconsin Quality of Life Index ICC = 0.71). While self-administration might be feasible, interview administration ofquestionnaires is recommended, since many of our clients had difficulty reading and interpreting the questions. The use of interviewers gives the researchers more control over the data quality, because the interviewers can define terms, clarify questions, and collect supplementary information. Our preliminary results suggest that client reports are feasible in assessing treatment outcome. When testing other types of reliability, like the interrater agreement, we do not show preference for one result over another. We cannot assume that a lack of physician-client agreement means that the client is wrong. Clients must be considered the experts on their own experience, since they are the only ones who directly experience their symptoms (2) . This is the belief that underlies the evolution of psychiatric care away from institutions toward client-centred community treatments. Unfortunately, the research and evaluation methods matching this type of treatment have lagged behind, so research to develop reliable instruments to collect information from clients on treatment outcomes should be apriority. A recent letter by Rojas-Fernandez and Gordon about selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRl) discontinuation syndrome suggested as a prevention strategy gradually tapering the dosage and, if the patient develops the syndrome during dose reduction, temporarily increasing the dose, with a slower rate of dose reduction once the symptoms have abated (1). I followed a different strategy. If a patient had discontinuation symptoms after gradual taper, I restarted the SSRl previous dose, adding fluoxetine for a week, then discontinued the SSRl and continued fluoxetine for another week. Fluoxetine discontinuation was not accompanied by withdrawal symptoms during the following weeks. The SSRI discontinuation syndrome includes dizziness, paresthesia, lethargy, nausea, depressed mood, anxiety, agitation, irritability, insomnia, vivid dreams, and headache (2, 3) . Also, severe depression and compulsions have been reported (4) . It may be caused by sudden synaptic serotonin drop (2) and is more common with short half-life SSRls (5, 6) . It has also been reported with venlafaxine (7) .
The 9 patients reported here could not discontinue an SSRl because ofwithdrawal symptoms, but they could discontinue it when fluoxetine was added. This strategy was successful in all of the patients. A Medline search found only a similar report about venlafaxine (8) .
Nine outpatients (88.8% female), aged 25-74 years, were diagnosed with major depressive disorder (33.3%), panic disorder (33.3%), and combined major depressive disorder and panic disorder (33.3%) and were in remission for more than 6 months. They were treated with paroxetine 20-40 mg daily (55.5%), clomipramine 150 mg daily (22.2%), venlafaxine 75 mg daily (11.1%), or sertraline 50 mg daily (11.1%) and discontinued the SSRI in 0-8 weeks (median 3 weeks). Twenty-four hours after discontinuation they had anxiety (88.8%); dizziness, nausea, insomnia (77.7%); paresthesia (66.6%); irritability (55.5%); agitation, depressed mood, and vivid dreams (33.3%); and tremor, diarrhea, loss of appetite, fatigue, agoraphobia, hypersomnia, and headache (11.1%). These symptoms disappeared within 24 hours ofrestarting the SSRI previous dose. Then, fluoxetine was added to the SSRI (2.5-20 mg daily, median 20 mg daily), for 1-2 weeks (median 1week). The SSRI was then discontinued, and fluoxetine was continued for 1-2 weeks (median 1 week), then discontinued. No withdrawal symptoms (or only mild and brief symptoms) appeared after fluoxetine discontinuation and during the following weeks. These findings suggest that fluoxetine may be used to suppress SSRI discontinuation symptoms, probably by preventing sudden serotonin drop through its long half-life metabolite (3).
